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WYETH V. LEVINE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN AND WHERE DO 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES GO FROM HERE 
Clay Landa
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the recent landmark decision in Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court 
put drug manufacturers on notice that they can and should be liable for state 
tort claims for the harm their products cause regardless of Federal Drug 
Administration (―FDA‖) approval of the drug‘s use and warning labels.1  
The decision dispels recent efforts by pharmaceutical companies to claim 
that they have no greater duty to warn consumers of risks from their 
products above and beyond the FDA‘s approved warnings.2  Therefore, 
drug makers, under current statutes and regulations, continue to bear the 
responsibility for maintaining the safety of their products and for keeping 
their warning labels up to date or face paying the price for state tort claims.3  
Drug makers may not claim that FDA approval of their drugs and warning 
labels, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (―FDCA‖), 
preempts state tort claims for failure to warn of risks that caused harm.4 
Absent a blanket federal preemption claim, drug makers find themselves 
back in a traditional products liability tort system.  In this setting, drug 
makers must continue to follow the mandates of the FDCA and 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Richmond School of Law; M.P.A., 2005, Virginia Commonwealth 
University; B.A., 1999, College of Charleston. Mr. Landa received the L. Douglas Wilder School of 
Government and Public Affairs 2006 Master of Public Administration Student of the Year Award and 
worked as a Policy Analyst for the Virginia State Board of Elections from 2004–2007. 
1. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202, 1204 (2009). 
2. See id. at 1199; Jonathan V. O‘Steen & Van O‘Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the Argument 
Against Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 67, 70 (2006) (noting that a finding of preemption would allow drug companies to skirt the 
common law duty to monitor their own products safety after approval). 
3. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1197–98; Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSWiki,  
http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=Wyeth_v._Levine (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
4. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204. 
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corresponding regulations for drug approval and warning labels.5  However, 
since federal preemption will not apply, even if the FDA approves a 
warning for a specific hazard, the drug maker may be found liable in state 
courts for harm caused by that hazard.6  A warning, therefore, even though 
approved by the FDA, may not be enough if the state courts determine the 
warning was not strong enough.7 
Without being able to point to one nationwide standard for warning 
labels and without specific state standards, drug makers would appear to be 
at the mercy of individual state court juries or judges to determine what 
warning was appropriate even though the FDA approved a specific warning 
label.  The court system, however, only informs drug makers after the fact 
that the warning was not strong enough and does not provide clear, specific 
standards for compliance like FDA regulations.8  Wyeth argued this exact 
point before the Supreme Court and urged that allowing state tort claims 
when the FDA approved a specific label would thwart the regulatory system 
set up by Congress in the FDCA.9 
Still, there are numerous avenues available for pharmaceutical 
companies to limit their liability and continue to produce and market drugs 
profitably.  The Supreme Court‘s decision does not implicate or amend the 
required FDA approval of warning labels.10  Therefore, one approach for a 
drug maker, knowing of a potential hazard, would be to unilaterally 
strengthen their warning without prior FDA approval under current 
regulations to head off any state tort claims for failure to warn.11  If the 
FDA ultimately determines not to approve the strengthened label, under 
explicit authority granted by Congress in the FDCA, drug makers have a 
strong argument that implicit conflict preemption now applies.12  As 
another avenue, drug makers may include a potential warning amounting to 
a prohibition of the drug‘s use or method of delivery when seeking initial 
approval of the warning label.13  Again, if the FDA explicitly rejects such a 
 
5. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006). 
6. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202. 
7. Id. at 1201–02. 
8. See W. Wylie Blair, Implied Preemption of State Tort Law Claims Against Prescription Drug 
Manufacturers Based Upon FDA Approval, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 289, 300 (2006) (arguing that state tort 
law actions are not a determination of a drug‘s risks and benefits founded  on a centralized expert 
evaluation). 
9. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199. 
10. Id. at 1198. 
11. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2009). 
12. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198 (stating that the Court will not hold it is impossible for drug 
manufacturer to comply with state tort claim and FDA labeling requirements absent clear evidence FDA 
would not have approved strengthened warning). 
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(d) (2006) (mandating new drug application, FDA determination that drug 
is safe and effective as shown in the proposed labeling, and the format and contents of drug labels 
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prohibitive warning, a drug maker may likely claim the FDA rejection 
preempts any state court requirement for the warning.14  In addition, drug 
makers may seek legislative action, both at the federal and state levels.15  In 
Congress, pharmaceutical companies could push for addition of an explicit 
preemption clause similar to one currently in the FDCA for medical 
devices.16  Finally, drug makers could take their case to state legislatures, 
seeking statutes that would not allow state tort claims for a failure to warn 
when the manufacturer complied with FDA regulations.17 
Part II of this paper analyzes the history and background of federal 
preemption to give context to the current environment after Wyeth.  Part III 
analyzes the Supreme Court‘s decision in Wyeth, holding that the FDCA 
and corresponding regulations do not preempt state tort claims.18  Finally, 
Part IV discusses and analyzes what drug makers may do now to continue 
to produce and market pharmaceuticals profitably while limiting their 
liability for state tort claims. 
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF PREEMPTION 
A. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. and the Intent and Purpose of Congress 
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court laid down its touchstone analysis that 
the intent and purpose of Congress is the key to determine if federal 
preemption obviates a state failure to warn tort claim.19  In this case, the 
Court considered whether two federal cigarette labeling acts in 1965 and 
1969 providing express preemption provisions sufficed to preempt state 
failure to warn claims.20  The 1965 Act contained a vague preemption 
provision, providing that no other statement other than that required by the 
Act was required on any cigarette package.21  In 1969, Congress amended 
the labeling preemption provision to provide that no state could impose any 
requirement or prohibition concerning the advertising or promotion of any 
cigarette packages labeled in conformity with the Act.22 
 
including the risk information the label must contain). 
14. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198. 
15. See infra Part IV.C. 
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
17. See infra notes 152–55 and accompanying text. 
18. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204. 
19. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516–20 (1992). 
20. Id. at 514–15. 
21. Id. at 514 (quoting Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat. 
282, 283 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (2006))). 
22. Id. at 515 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5, 84 Stat. 
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As the two Acts contained express preemption provisions, the Court 
needed only to engage in standard statutory construction to determine the 
extent of the federal preemption and whether it was Congress‘ intent to 
preempt tort claims for failure to warn.23  The Court found the 1969 
amendments prohibiting any differing state requirements did preempt state 
tort claims, as the failure to warn would impose an additional duty or a 
requirement on a cigarette manufacturer.24  As the 1965 Act did not prohibit 
any such requirements, this version of the Act did not preempt a state 
common law claim.25  While Cipollone provided an exercise in statutory 
construction of an express provision, it also laid the cornerstone for implied 
conflict preemption through Justice Blackmun‘s concurrence.26  Justice 
Blackmun agreed with the majority that the intent and purpose of Congress 
was the touchstone of any preemption analysis, but added that absent an 
express provision, the Court must resort to the principles of implied 
preemption to determine whether state law actually conflicts with federal 
law.27  In essence, the Court must attempt to determine the intent of 
Congress to supplant a state law when Congress is silent.28 
B. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. and Frustration of Purpose 
In Geier, the plaintiff brought a claim against Honda, alleging that the 
manufacturer negligently designed the vehicle by not equipping it with a 
driver‘s side airbag.29  Honda argued the Department of Transportation‘s 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, which allowed car 
manufacturers to select from a range of safety features, preempted a state 
negligence claim as Honda complied with the minimum safety standard.30  
The question appeared to center on whether states could impose tort 
liability upon a car manufacturer who failed to exceed the federal 
standard.31 
 
 
87, 88 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006))). 
23. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2100 (2000) (noting that 
when Congress includes an express preemption clause, the work of the Court is limited and 
straightforward: ―to interpret the express preemption clause and determine whether the state law at issue 
falls within the preemptive scope‖). 
24. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522. 
25. Id. at 519–20. 
26. Id. at 532 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Geier v Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000). 
30. Id. at 881. 
31. O‘Steen & O‘Steen, supra note 2, at 73–74. 
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The Court, however, as indicated by Justice Blackmun‘s concurrence in 
Cipollone, did not just ask whether the federal standard created a ceiling or 
a floor for safety regulations, but considered the purpose and intent of the 
Department of Transportation in creating the regulation.32  First, the Court 
interpreted the express preemption provision contained in the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,33 providing that no state could 
establish a safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a 
motor vehicle or equipment which is not identical to the federal standard.34  
Next, the Court considered the effect of the express preemption provision in 
light of a savings clause that compliance with a federal safety standard does 
not exempt any person from liability under common law.35  The Court held 
that a reading of the preemption clause and savings clause together showed 
that Congress did not intend the Act or implementing regulations to 
preempt common law tort claims.36 
The Court‘s analysis did not end there, however.  While Congress‘ intent 
may not have been to preempt tort actions, the Court considered the statute, 
specifically the safety standard approved by the Department of 
Transportation, under the doctrine of implied conflict preemption to 
consider whether a state tort action would frustrate the objectives of the 
Department even though Congress expressly stated preemption did not 
apply.37  The Court determined that while the express provision did not 
preempt state law claims, the Department of Transportation intended to 
gradually introduce safety improvements over time.38  Therefore, holding 
manufacturers liable for not exceeding the federal safety requirements 
under state tort law would frustrate this objective of gradual introduction, 
and thus, the federal safety standard preempted state tort claims.39 
C. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine: Setting the Floor, Not the Ceiling for 
Actions 
In Sprietsma, the plaintiff brought a common law tort claim against a 
boat manufacturer, alleging the propeller that injured her after falling 
overboard should have been equipped with a propeller guard.40  As in 
Geier, the Court first interpreted an express preemption clause, stating that 
 
32. Geier, 529 U.S. at 881. 
33. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30170 (2006). 
34. Geier, 529 U.S. at 867 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (repealed 1994)). 
35. Id. at 868. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 870–86. 
38. Id. at 874–75. 
39. Id. at 875. 
40. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 55 (2002). 
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no state may enact a boat safety standard that is not identical with the 
federal regulations, and a savings clause, stating that compliance with 
federal regulations does not relieve a person from common or state law 
liability.41  Again, as in Geier, the Court rejected that the federal standard 
preempted all state tort claims and looked to whether implied conflict 
preemption obviated state claims.42  While the Geier Court found implied 
preemption applied, the Coast Guard‘s lack of enacting a safety regulation 
to require propeller guards in Sprietsma after a lengthy study did not 
preempt state tort actions.43  The Coast Guard‘s failure to act indicated that 
the Coast Guard had not made a policy decision that propeller guards were 
unnecessary and that states should or could not impose more stringent 
safety measures.44 
D. Medical Device and Drug Cases: Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr and Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc. 
In Lohr, the Court considered whether federal laws and regulations 
preempted a state claim for a failed pacemaker and a failure to warn of the 
potential problem.45  As in previously discussed cases, the medical device 
portion of the federal act contained an express preemption provision, 
prohibiting states from enacting any medical device requirements different 
from or in addition to federal standards.46  While such a provision appeared 
to preempt state claims, the devil was once again in the details.  Here, the 
FDA approved the device under a grandfather clause, allowing the device as 
substantially equivalent to a device in existence before passage of the 
amendments in 1976 and therefore subjecting it to a much less rigorous 
examination process.47  The Court determined that the less stringent 
examination process did not impose specific design requirements and 
without such requirements, the federal standards could not preempt state 
regulation.48  Similarly, FDA regulations concerning labels and warnings 
did not preempt state failure to warn claims because they were too general 
to be applicable to the specific device in question.49  Finally, the Court 
affirmed that in all preemption cases, there is a presumption against 
preemption absent a clear congressional intent to supersede state law, 
 
41. Id. at 58–59 (quoting 46 U.S.C. §§ 4306, 4311 (2006)). 
42. Id. at 65. 
43. Id. at 67. 
44. Id. at 66–67. 
45. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 481 (1996). 
46. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
47. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478–80. 
48. Id. at 497. 
49. Id. at 501. 
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including state common law.50 
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme Court again considered claims 
of negligence, labeling, and implied warranty against a manufacturer under 
the very same statutes as Lohr.51  Contrary to Lohr, the catheter in question 
here underwent a more rigorous pre-market approval process by the FDA.52  
Therefore, the Court considered whether the pre-market approval process 
and FDA approval imposed federal requirements and then whether a state 
tort claim differed from those requirements.53  If state common law claims 
imposed any differing requirement, federal standards must preempt state 
claims according to the express preemption provision in the Medical Device 
Amendments.54  The rigorous pre-market approval process, which is 
specific to each device tested and approved by the FDA, imposed the type 
of requirements that were missing under the substantial equivalence test in 
Lohr.55  Since the common law claim in question sought to require the 
catheter to be safer than the model approved by the FDA, a state tort action 
imposed a differing and heightened requirement.56  The federal law thus 
preempted such a differing requirement.57 
Riegel was important not only for this statutory interpretation of the 
express preemption clause, but also for its discussion of the level of agency 
deference the Court should afford to the FDA‘s interpretation of the 
FDCA.58  The Court specifically noted they did not have to rely on the 
FDA‘s position that preemption applies because the statute speaks for itself, 
but did agree with the dissent that only minimal deference under Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co. would apply.59  Under Skidmore, the weight given to the 
agency‘s interpretation ―‗depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, 
if lacking power to control.‘‖60  This consideration of agency deference 
provides keen insight into the Court‘s decision in Wyeth v. Levine, where 
there is no express preemption provision to guide the Court‘s 
 
50. Id. at 485. 
51. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320–21 (2008). 
52. Id. at 317–20. 
53. Id. at 321–22. 
54. Id. at 316 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)). 
55. Id. at 322–23. 
56. Id. at 324–25. 
57. Id. at 330. 
58. Id. at 326–27. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 338 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944)). 
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determination.61 
III. WYETH V. LEVINE 
A. Regulatory Scheme 
A manufacturer, such as Wyeth, must submit a New Drug Application to 
the FDA for approval of all new pharmaceutical drugs, in this case 
Phenergan.62  The FDA must approve the drug unless the manufacturer fails 
to demonstrate that the drug is safe and effective, the drug will perform as 
represented, and the label is not false or misleading.63  The FDA then 
mandates through regulations the format and content of drug labels, as well 
as the risk information the label must contain.64  Once approved, normally 
any changes to the label and warnings must receive FDA approval before 
the manufacturer issues the altered label.65  However, the FDA regulations 
also allow a manufacturer to distribute a drug with an altered label after 
submitting the change to the FDA, but prior to any FDA approval, if the 
changes ―‗add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution or 
adverse reaction‘ or... ‗add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and 
administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug 
product.‘‖66  Therefore, section 314.70(c) allows a drug manufacturer to 
strengthen the warnings given on a label without any FDA approval or 
regulation.67 
B. Phenergan‘s Uses and Levine‘s Circumstances 
Under this regulatory scheme, the FDA approved a warning label 
submitted by Wyeth that provided when injecting the drug intravenously, 
heath care workers should exercise extreme care to avoid intra-arterial 
injection.68  Such intra-arterial injection could lead to pain, severe chemical 
irritation, severe spasms, and gangrene requiring amputation.69  In addition, 
the warning indicated, ―it is usually preferable to inject it through the tubing 
of an intravenous infusion set that is known to be functioning 
 
61. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1190 (2009). 
62. Id. at 1194–95 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)). 
63. Id. at 1195; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006). 
64. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(b) (2009)). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2009)). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1192. 
69. Id. at 1191 n.1. 
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satisfactorily.‖ 70  Therefore, the Phenergan label did not prohibit the use of 
direct intravenous injection or IV-push administration or indicate such a 
method should not be used.71 
In April 2000, the plaintiff visited a local clinic complaining of nausea 
resulting from a migraine headache.72  Medical staff first administered the 
drug by intramuscular injection, which caused no harmful side effects.73  
The same day, when the nausea continued, medical staff directly injected 
Phenergan by the IV-push method rather than through tubing or 
intramuscular injection.74  The medical staff inadvertently injected the drug 
into an artery resulting in severe damage, gangrene, and ultimately the 
amputation of Levine‘s hand and forearm.75 
Levine brought a claim against Wyeth in Vermont Superior Court for 
negligence and failure to warn, arguing that the label should have prohibited 
IV push, as it was safer to use other available options.76  Wyeth countered 
with three arguments: (1) the FDA‘s approval of the drug label impliedly 
preempted state common law claims that the label was inadequate; (2) the 
FDA was aware of the dangers of IV push but did not prohibit its use so 
Wyeth could not prohibit its use; and (3) state common law claims 
penalizing drug companies for using FDA approved labels would pose an 
obstacle to the purpose of the FDA‘s labeling regulations.77 
C. Holding and Analysis 
1. Purpose and Intent of Congress and Presumption Against Preemption 
Prior to analyzing Wyeth‘s arguments that it would be impossible to 
comply with federal and state law and that state tort claims would obstruct 
the objectives and purposes of Congress, the Court set down two judicial 
cornerstones of preemption to guide the Court‘s decision.78  ―First, ‗the 
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption 
case.‘‖79  Second, in a preemption case where Congress has legislated in a 
field traditionally left to the states, the Court applies a presumption against 
 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 1191–92 n.1. 
72. Id. at 1191. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1191–92. 
77. Id. at 1192–93. 
78. Id. at 1194. 
79. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
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preemption because the ―‗historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.‘‖80 
The history of the FDCA and the regulatory scheme dictated above 
indicate that Congress required the manufacturer to prove and maintain the 
safety and effectiveness of their drugs.81  Further, Congress took great care 
to ensure the continuation of state law in the face of federal legislation by 
inserting a savings clause in 1962, which detailed that a federal law would 
only preempt state law upon a direct and positive conflict with the FDCA.82  
Notably, Congress enacted an express preemption provision for medical 
devices in 1976 but chose not to include a similar provision for prescription 
drugs.83  Finally, after Levine‘s lawsuit against Wyeth commenced, 
Congress again amended the FDCA to grant the FDA authority to require a 
drug maker to change a warning label based on information that becomes 
available after a drug‘s initial approval; however, Congress specifically 
rejected a proposed provision to require FDA preapproval of any change to 
a label.84 
2. Complying with Both State and Federal Law is Not Impossible 
Wyeth first contended that the FDA mandates the Company use the 
specific and identical label approved for the drug.85  Further, Wyeth argued 
an amendment to the regulation, allowing a change to the warning label 
without FDA approval, simply reaffirmed the accepted interpretation of the 
regulation that a manufacturer may only strengthen a warning ―to reflect 
newly acquired information.‖86  Therefore, Wyeth argued, this section 
mandates a strengthened warning only if new information has emerged that 
the FDA did not have when initially approving the warning label.87  
Without any such information presented in this case, Wyeth argued it was 
impossible for them to strengthen Phenergan‘s label to comply with the 
state duty imposed by Vermont and comply with the FDA mandate.88  If 
Wyeth had chosen to unilaterally strengthen their warning without any 
 
80. Id. at 1194–95 (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485). 
81. Id. at 1195. 
82. Id. at 1196. 
83. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)). 
84. Id. (citing Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, § 901, Publ. L. No. 110-85, 
121 Stat. 823, 922 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 555 (Supp. I 2009)); Prescription Drug User Fee 
Amendments of 2007, S. 1082, 110th Cong. § 208 (2007) (as passed by Senate, Apr. 10, 2007) 
(proposing new section 506D)). 
85. Id. at 1196 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(b) (2009)). 
86. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2009)). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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newly acquired information that the FDA did not consider when approving 
the label, so the argument goes, they would violate federal law.89 
The Supreme Court determined that either under the new clarification in 
the regulation or as it stood at the time of Levine‘s injury, Wyeth could 
have complied with federal requirements and strengthened the warning to 
comply with Vermont‘s requirements.90  Specifically, even under the new 
interpretation requiring ―newly acquired information,‖ Wyeth could have 
strengthened their warning based on a new analysis of existing data that 
Wyeth already submitted to the FDA.91  While Wyeth knew of the risks of 
Phenergan administrated by IV push, a new analysis of this risk could have 
shown an adverse reaction of a different type, greater severity, or higher 
frequency that would constitute newly acquired information under the 
regulation.92  The record indicated at least twenty cases of gangrene and 
subsequent amputations from Phenergan injections, and therefore, Wyeth 
had ample opportunity to review this data to determine a greater risk and 
strengthen the warning as specifically allowed without FDA approval.93 
Further, strengthening the warning prior to FDA approval would not 
result in an unauthorized distribution of a drug or misbranding.94  
Unauthorized distribution only occurs when a manufacturer puts out a new 
drug.95  Strengthening a label on an existing drug, under specific regulations 
that grant drug makers the authority to strengthen the label prior to FDA 
approval, does not make Phenergan a new drug.96  In addition, misbranding 
does not occur simply because a manufacturer altered a label as allowed 
under regulations or else the regulation would have no meaning.97 
 
While the Supreme Court could have stopped there and held it was not 
impossible for Wyeth to comply with both state and federal law, the Court 
further stated that under the FDCA, drug manufacturers, and not the FDA, 
bear the primary responsibility for the safety of their products.98  When the 
risk of gangrene and amputation became apparent to Wyeth, they had a duty 
to provide a warning that adequately detailed the risk, and federal 
 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 1196–97. 
91. Id. at 1197. 
92. Id. (citing Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, 
and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,607 (Aug. 22, 2008)). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006) (defining ―new drug‖); 21 C.F.R. § 310.3(h) (2009)). 
97. See id. 
98. Id. at 1197–98. 
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regulations specifically provided an avenue to provide this warning prior to 
FDA approval.99  The Supreme Court further stated that they would not 
hold it was impossible to comply with both federal and state requirements 
without clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected the strengthened 
warning required by state law.100  For Phenergan, the FDA did review 
evidence of the risks of IV push and approve a label that did specifically 
warn against the risks of improper administration.101  In this case, however, 
there was no evidence the FDA ―gave more than passing attention to the 
issue,‖ the FDA made an affirmative decision to retain IV push, the FDA 
would have prohibited a strengthened warning, or that Wyeth submitted an 
extensive evaluation or analysis about the specific dangers from IV push.102  
The Vermont courts required a strengthened warning, the FDA regulations 
allowed Wyeth to strengthen Phenergan‘s warning, and Wyeth failed to 
present any evidence that the FDA would have prevented that warning.103 
3. State Tort Claims Do Not Obstruct the Purposes and Objectives of 
Congress to Regulate Drug Labels 
Alternatively, Wyeth argued that FDA regulations are both the ceiling 
and floor for pharmaceutical warning labels such that FDA approval 
preempts any state tort claim concerning the drug‘s warning, regardless of 
whether the FDA considered the risk at issue.104  Further, Wyeth argued that 
since the FDA determines that a drug is safe and its warning adequate, the 
Court must presume that the FDA performed a ―precise balancing of risks 
and benefits and... established a specific labeling standard that leaves no 
room for different state-law judgments.‖105 
 
The Court strenuously dismissed these arguments.  First, the entire 
history of Congressional action in passing and amending the FDCA 
indicates Congressional intent to continue to allow state tort claims in the 
face of federal legislation.106  Further, throughout the seventy-year history 
of the FDCA, Congress never chose to include an express preemption 
provision for pharmaceutical drugs, while they did choose to do so for 
 
99. Id. at 1198. 
100. Id. 
101. See id. at 1198 & n.5. 
102. Id. at 1199. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 1200. 
106. Id. at 1199; see also id. at 1199–1200 n.7 (stating that Congress did not provide a federal remedy 
for consumers in the 1938 statute specifically because witnesses testified that no such action was 
necessary since common law claims were already available under state law). 
2010] WHERE DO COMPANIES GO FROM HERE? 283 
medical devices, over the counter medications, and cosmetics.107  Where 
Congress is aware of state law that may potentially conflict with a federal 
interest and it chooses not to act, ―‗the case for federal preemption is 
particularly weak‘‖, especially in light of the presumption against 
preemption.108 
In spite of Congress‘ apparent intent to remain silent, Wyeth argued the 
Court should rely on a recently enacted preamble to a 2006 FDA regulation, 
stating that the FDCA does act as a ceiling and a floor so that any approved 
FDA label preempts state tort claims.109  The FDA preamble further stated 
that state tort claims threatened the FDA‘s role to act as the expert 
evaluating and regulating drugs.110 
While the Court has recognized that agency regulations carrying the 
force of law can preempt a state claim, the Court has only found so after 
conducting its own conflict determination by interpreting the state and 
federal law and has not relied solely on the agency‘s determination of 
preemption.111  Where Congress has not expressly delegated preemption 
authority to an agency, the Court may give some weight to an agency 
assertion of preemption.112  However, the Court does not solely defer to the 
agency‘s conclusion that preemption is appropriate, but instead gives some 
weight to the agency‘s explanation of how the state claims will affect the 
federal regulatory scheme.113 
In this case, the Court concluded the FDA‘s preamble merited no 
deference.114  Specifically, the FDA enacted the preamble in 2006 without 
compliance with administrative law requirements for notice and comment 
and after the initial proposed rule explained there would be no preemption 
 
107. Id. at 1200 (―Congress could have applied [the medical device] pre-emption clause to the entire 
FDCA.  It did not do so, but instead wrote a pre-emption clause that applies only to medical devices.‖ 
(citing Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008))); id. at 1200 n.8 (Congress preempted 
certain state requirements for over the counter medications and cosmetics, but stated ―‗[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed to modify  or otherwise affect any action or the liability of any person under 
the product liability law of any State.‘‖ (quoting 21 U.S.C. §§ 379r(e), 379s(d) (2006))). 
108. Id. at 1200 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989)). 
109. Id. (citing Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Perscription Drug and 
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,922, 3,934–35 (Jan. 24, 2006)). 
110. Id. (citing Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Perscription Drug and 
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3,935). 
111. Id. at 1201. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. (―[W]e have given ‗some weight‘ to an agency‘s views about the impact of tort law on federal 
objectives when ‗the subject matter is technical[l] and the relevant history and background are complex 
and extensive.‘  Even in such cases, however, we have not deferred to an agency‘s conclusion that state 
law is preempted.‖ (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000))). 
114. Id. 
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or federalism effects.115  Again, while the Court could have stopped here, 
they chose to go further and state that the preamble was completely at odds 
with the long history of the FDA and with evidence of Congress‘ 
purpose.116 
Further, the Court determined federal drug labeling requirements were 
not analogous to the regulatory scheme presented in Geier.117  In Geier, the 
Court found preemption based on its own analysis of the issues, finding that 
a state law claim requiring a specific vehicle safety device would pose an 
obstacle to the properly adopted federal scheme of phasing in safety 
devices.118  After undergoing this independent analysis, the Geier Court 
considered the agency‘s preemption conclusion only as further support for 
their holding.119  In Wyeth, the Court did not consider a regulation carrying 
the force of law, and even if it had, the long history of the FDCA and the 
FDA‘s position on state tort claims indicates that state tort claims do not 
pose an obstacle to federal drug labeling regulations.120 
IV. GOING FORWARD: PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES‘ REACTIONS 
In the wake of this landmark decision, the pharmaceutical companies‘ 
worst fears seemed realized; instead of one regulatory compliance scheme, 
they would be subject to the whim of fifty states‘ court systems.121  An 
initial reading of the Wyeth decision would appear to put drug makers in a 
potentially hazardous position.  They still need to comply with the FDCA 
and corresponding federal regulations to submit data about benefits and 
risks of a drug along with proposed warning labels.122  However, drug 
companies still have a duty to provide an adequate warning as judged by 
each individual state‘s judicial system, and the drug companies have no 
standards or guidelines to follow to determine what each individual state 
considers adequate warning.123 
 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1203. 
118. Geier, 529 U.S. at 874–75. 
119. Id. at 875–77. 
120. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1203–04. 
121. Steve Forbes, Supremely Destructive Stupidity, FORBES, Apr. 13, 2009, at 13 (remarking that the 
Supreme Court‘s finding allowing state tort liability for federally approved drugs will lead to situations 
where drug makers must prepare for warning labels as judged by fifty states rather than one federally 
delegated authority). 
122. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(d) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2009). 
123. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Age: The Supreme Court and the Tyranny of Lawyers, WALL. 
ST. J., Mar. 9, 2009, at A17 (stating that every drug must carry fifty different warnings, one for each 
state, and even then, these warnings may be updated from time to time by local juries). 
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While many in the business community are lambasting this precarious 
position imposed on drug makers and potentially other businesses,124 there 
are numerous options available for pharmaceutical companies to limit their 
liability, comply with both state and federal laws, and continue to market 
their products profitably. 
A. Strengthened Warnings Without Prior Approval 
As the Supreme Court noted, current FDA regulations allow a 
pharmaceutical company to unilaterally strengthen prescription medication 
warnings based upon newly acquired information without receiving prior 
FDA approval.125  The ―newly acquired information‖ does not have to be 
actual data of a risk that has surfaced since the approval of the drug.126  
Instead, a drug company may analyze existing data or information of 
greater risks or frequency of injuries and side effects to determine that the 
drug is causing harm.127  In light of the Supreme Court‘s strong language 
that drug companies carry the primary responsibility for post-approval 
monitoring of their drugs‘ safety,128 drug companies should consider 
themselves on notice to monitor this activity anyway. 
Drug companies may choose to strengthen their warnings, even to the 
point of equaling a prohibition on the drug‘s use or a specific method of 
delivery, and then submit this change to the FDA as required for 
approval.129  As the FDA retains ultimate authority to review this change 
and either approve or reject the new labels use, the drug companies would 
have concrete evidence if sued in state torts to argue for preemption.130  If 
the FDA denied the use of the strengthened warning and then an injured 
party sues the company in state court for failure to adequately warn, the 
drug company can rely on this denial as evidence that they could not 
provide a stronger warning under federal law.131  In such a case, the 
 
124. See id.; Forbes supra note 121. 
125. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196–97. 
126. Id. at 1197 (citing Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drug, 
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49, 603, 49, 604 (Aug. 22, 2008)). 
127. Id. (citing Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, 
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. at 49,606–07). 
128. Id. at 1197–98. 
129. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2009). 
130. See Blair, supra note 8, at 298–99 (noting that the FDA can make a drug manufacturer withdraw a 
strengthened label if the FDA does not think it is necessary). 
131. See id. at 299 (―If FDA does not allow a drug manufacturer to warn the public of potential dangers 
posed by a product, yet the manufacturer still is held liable for failure to warn under a state tort claim, it 
is impossible for the manufacturer to comply with both state and federal requirements.  It is difficult to 
ascertain how FDA‘s regulation could have been considered to do anything but preempt the field.‖); 
Dinh, supra note 23, at 2102 (stating that conflict preemption can be found, regardless if Congress 
appeared silent on the issue, if a state law actually conflicts with a federal law). 
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company would have evidence of exactly what the Supreme Court in Wyeth 
stated was lacking to find preemption—it would be impossible to comply 
with both federal and state law.132 
B. Submission of a Prohibition Warning and Greater Evidence of Risk 
Along the same lines as unilaterally strengthening warnings of drugs 
already approved, pharmaceutical companies could submit numerous 
proposed warnings with a new drug application along with greater evidence 
of all risks and benefits associated with the drug‘s use.  The drug makers 
bear the ultimate responsibility for the safety of their own products,133 but 
the FDA continues to shoulder the role as the expert federal agency charged 
with weighing the benefits and risks of a drug, along with proposed warning 
labels, before approving the drug‘s use and warning label.134  The Wyeth 
Court decision against preemption mainly relied on the fact that the FDA 
did not make an affirmative decision to allow IV-push administration, did 
not consider a prohibition of this use or strengthened warning, and did not 
consider extensive evidence of the risks and benefits of the method.135 
Therefore, a pharmaceutical company may submit extensive evidence of 
a risk inherent in a drug along with several proposed warning labels, even 
one amounting to a prohibition on a specific use for the drug or a delivery 
method.  Because the FDA is responsible for reviewing all of this 
information and the proposed warning labels, the FDA will be forced to 
choose an appropriate label if the FDA approves the drug.  As with the 
strengthened warnings for approved drugs detailed above, the drug maker 
can point to the FDA‘s explicit refusal to allow a strengthened warning to 
illustrate it would be impossible to comply with the FDA requirements and 
state law.136 
Further, if the expert agency charged with regulating drug use and 
warning labels truly considers a wide possibility of proposed warnings as 
well as extensive evidence of the drug‘s risks and benefits, a pharmaceutical 
company may argue the decision of the FDA falls under Geier and not 
 
132. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198 (holding that without clear evidence that the FDA would have 
rejected the strengthened warning, the Court would not find preemption due to the impossibility to 
comply with both federal and state law). 
133. Id. at 1197–98. 
134. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(d) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2009). 
135. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198–99. 
136. See id. at 1198 (holding that without clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected the 
strengthened warning, the Court would not find preemption due to the impossibility to comply with both 
federal and state law); Blair, supra note 8, at 299 (stating that express rejection of a proposed warning 
by the FDA should preempt a state tort claim requiring the same warning). 
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Wyeth.137  The Supreme Court specifically held that Geier did not apply to 
the warning label for Phenergan primarily because there was no extensive 
record indicating the FDA‘s balancing of risks and benefits of heightened 
warnings.138  While the Wyeth Court also recognized the federal agency‘s 
rule in Geier was worthy of some level of deference because they 
conducted a formal rulemaking, the holding shows the Court is more likely 
to find preemption when the agency record reveals ―the factors the agency 
had weighed and the balance it had struck....‖139  Therefore, even after 
Wyeth, a drug manufacturer may still successfully argue that implied 
preemption applies to negate a state tort claim.140  If the drug manufacturer 
can point to specific evidence where the FDA did consider the risks and 
benefits of a certain label and required another label, then a state tort claim 
requiring more may very well frustrate the purposes and objectives of 
Congress.141 
The courts may soon test this argument as the Supreme Court recently 
remanded a drug warning preemption case where the Third Circuit found 
preemption of state tort claims.142  In Colacicco, the Third Circuit deferred 
to the FDA‘s preamble asserting preemption, failed to apply a strong 
presumption against preemption, and failed to recognize that drug 
manufacturers maintain responsibility for drug safety through their ability 
to update warnings prior to FDA approval under FDA regulations.143  These 
ruling are inconsistent with the Supreme Court‘s decision and may very 
well change the outcome of the case in Colacicco.144  However, such a 
result is not a foregone conclusion.  In Colacicco, the Third Circuit 
specifically distinguished the facts and decision of the Vermont Supreme 
Court in Wyeth.145  The Third Circuit based its finding of preemption 
 
137. See Posting of Anthony J. Sebok to FindLaw.com, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20090317.html (Mar. 17, 2009) (stating that implicit preemption 
because a state law frustrates the objectives and purposes of federal law may occur when the FDA has 
considered the background reasons for allowing or disallowing a warning and made a decision on which 
label to require). 
138. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1203. 
139. Id. 
140. See Sebok, supra note 137 (arguing that a showing of the background reasons for a rejection may 
provide a record of the balancing of risks and benefits to show a heightened warning would frustrate the 
purpose of the FDA when a state may require what the FDA specifically rejected). 
141. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1203–04. 
142. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578, 1578–79 (2009) (remanding case to the Third Circuit 
for further consideration in light of Wyeth). 
143. See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 264–68, 275–76 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 
1578 (2009). 
144. See Colacicco, 129 S. Ct. at 1578–79. 
145. See Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 271–72 n.17 (stating the Vermont Supreme Court found no evidence 
that the FDA intended to prohibit defendant from strengthening the warning and therefore it was not 
impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state requirements but that the facts in Colacicco 
are different). 
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mainly on the extensive record of the drugs‘ benefits and risks considered 
by the FDA, including the risk at issue in the case.146  Preemption applied, 
like in Geier, because the FDA made an affirmative decision that the 
science did not support a warning such as that sought by the plaintiffs in the 
case.147  If the Third Circuit still makes such a finding on remand and the 
Supreme Court does not hear and alter the outcome of the case, 
pharmaceutical companies still have an avenue to pursue preemption 
claims.148 
C. Seeking Legislative Changes 
Rather than seek additional preemption decisions from the courts, which 
will be hard pressed to issue such findings after Wyeth, the easiest path may 
very well be to seek legislative action.  A clear message from Congress to 
preempt state tort claims for pharmaceutical drugs in light of the Supreme 
Court‘s holding will completely reverse the decision.  Further, as the 
current Congress may very well be disinclined to seek such an action, the 
drug companies may seek legislative remedies on the state level. 
Congress has seen fit to include an express preemption provision for 
medical devices in the FDCA.149  The Supreme Court upheld this express 
preemption provision in Reigel v. Medtronic specifically because the 
medical device at issue had undergone an extensive pre-market approval 
process by the FDA.150  Congress may be leery to add a similar provision 
under the current circumstances of the FDA approval process and safety-
monitoring regime for fear the FDA cannot adequately ensure the safety of 
prescription drugs.151 
Alternatively, drug companies could seek redress from individual state 
legislatures to enact their own federal preemption statutes.  Such statutes 
could take many forms such as a statute allowing complete immunity from 
state tort claims and liability when the FDA approved the drug and its 
 
146. Id. at 271–72. 
147. Id. 
148. See Sebok, supra note 137 (noting that if pharmaceutical companies submit the scientific work as 
in Colacicco, then Wyeth may have produced a good result). 
149. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
150. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315–23 (2008). 
151. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 & n.11 (2009) (noting that ―the FDA has limited 
resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market, and manufacturers have superior access to 
information about their drugs, especially in the postmarketing phase as new risks emerge‖ and citing 
three recent studies stating the FDA was not in a position to meet its current or emerging regulatory 
responsibilities); O‘Steen & O‘Steen, supra note 2, at 85–86 (remarking that approximately half of the 
FDA‘s drug evaluation budget comes from fees paid by the pharmaceutical companies in return for 
expedited approval of drugs, a system that provides an incentive for the FDA to rush drugs to the market 
without undertaking thorough studies to determine the risks of drugs). 
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label.152  While this type of statute provides the greatest protection for 
pharmaceutical companies, it allows no avenue for injured parties to seek 
redress when even the Supreme Court has acknowledged the FDA cannot 
guarantee drug safety.153  Prescription drug companies could seek weaker 
state protections, such as those in place in Texas and New Jersey, where 
compliance with FDA regulations for warning labels provides a rebuttable 
presumption of the drug‘s safety.154  Finally, other states, such as Utah and 
Oregon, at least attempt to limit liability by barring punitive damages for 
drug manufacturers whose drugs and warnings comply with current FDA 
regulations.155 
V. CONCLUSION 
After Wyeth v. Levine, one thing is clear: pharmaceutical companies are 
responsible for the safety of their own products and potentially liable in 
state courts for any injuries their products may cause.156  While drug makers 
have pushed recently for a broad ruling that FDA approval of the drug‘s use 
and warning labels preempts any state tort claims, the Supreme Court 
resoundingly dispelled this argument.157  While many in the business 
community lambasted the Supreme Court‘s decision for the effects it might 
cause on the business community,158 the truth of the matter may not be as 
catastrophic as initially thought.  Within the ruling itself, there may still be 
room for a finding of preemption if a pharmaceutical company can show 
that the FDA considered and affirmatively rejected a strengthened 
warning.159  In addition, an extensive record of the FDA‘s consideration of 
the risks and benefits of a drug, including the specific risk associated with 
an injury, may allow a finding of preemption.160  These two approaches to 
limiting liability may spur pharmaceutical companies to do exactly what the 
Supreme Court wanted—closely monitor their own products, continue to 
inform the FDA about risks and benefits, and allow the expert federal 
 
152. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946(5) (2000) (stating that a drug is not defective or 
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agency to make a final determination.161  Alternatively, drug manufacturers 
may attempt legislative remedies to immunize themselves from liability, 
such as an express preemption clause in the FDCA similar to the existing 
clause for medical devices.162  As this option may not gain much traction 
with the current Congress, pharmaceutical companies may instead seek 
state legislation that inoculates them from liability based upon FDA 
approval for their drugs.163  One thing is clear after Wyeth v. Levine, 
pharmaceutical companies will have to do more work to limit their liability 
from any harm their products may cause. 
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